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1
INTRODUCTION
Like most African countries, Kenya is faced with an
intractable municipal solid waste problem, evidenced
by growing rates of waste generation and challenges
of effective collection, treatment and disposal of the
same.1 In Nairobi City for instance, waste generation
is estimated to have risen from 1530MT per day in
20022 to 2600MT in 2015,3  with close to 50 per cent
of the waste left uncollected by local authorities. Out
of the waste collected in Nairobi, only an estimated 33
percent is tipped at the official (Dandora) dumpsite in
the eastern outskirts of  the city, while the rest is
disposed in hundreds of illegal dumpsites across the
city.4 Even though 95 per cent of  solid waste collected
in Nairobi is deemed to be re-useable, only about 5-10
per cent is recycled or composited, predominantly by
informal waste actors.5
It is estimated that only 40 per cent of urban residents
access waste collection services currently provided largely
by County authorities, despite the fact that private sector
and community groups, especially in the major cities
of Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu, require these
services.6  However, coverage in poor neighbourhoods
is rather low and collection fees considered unaffordable
for most, yet 40 per cent of the urban population
resides in such areas.7 Environmental and health
impacts resulting from poor municipal solid waste
management (MSWM) are indeed profound as a recent
study reveals that 28 per cent and 14 per cent of
households in Nairobi and Mombasa respectively
reported health problems associated with poor waste
management.8
Weak organisational capacities (financial, personnel,
technological) of institutions responsible for regulation
and service provision is considered  a major cause of
poor performance of MSWM systems in urban areas
in Kenya.9  Lack of a clear decentralised framework for
MSWM undermines the efficacy of county authorities
in discharging their mandates at the local level.10
Political interference and low prioritisation of MSWM
in county budget-making processes undermine
capacities of County governments to discharge their
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County’ (MBA thesis, United States International
University Africa, 2017) 63.
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13 The United Nations, ‘Report of  the World Commission
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Future’ 1987 at Chapter 12, para 11 <www.un-
documents.net/our-common-future.pdf>; see also
United Nations, ‘Gaps in International Environmental
Law and Environment-related Instruments: Towards A
Global Pact for the Environment’ - Report of the
Secretary General, 30 November 2018 <https://
wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/
27070/SGGaps.pdf ?sequence=3&isAllowed=y>.
14 Emmanuel Mathieu and others, ‘Regulatory Agencies
and Multi-actor Regulatory Governance: A Method to
Study Regulatory Fragmentation, Specialisation,
Coordination and Centralisation’ (EPGA Study Group
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Conference, Bucharest September 2011) 11.
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Governance: An International Journal of Policy and
Administration 59.
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18 Journal of Law and Society 18-19.
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18 Karl Hogl and Ralf Nordbeck, ‘The Challenge of
Coordination: Bridging Horizontal and Vertical
Boundaries’ in Karl Hogl and others (eds), Environmental
Governance: The Challenge of Legitimacy and Effectiveness
(Edward Elgar 2012) 112.
19 William Lafferty and Eivind Hovden, ‘Environmental
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(2003) 12 Environmental Politics 14-17.
20 Cap 387 of Laws of Kenya.
21 Anne Angwenyi, ‘An Overview of  the Environmental
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Patricia Kameri-Mbote and Migai Akech (eds),
Environmental Governance in Kenya: Implementing the Framework
Law (East African Educational Publishers 2008); the
author notes that Prior to EMCA, Kenya’s environmental
management legal framework was also characterised by
incoherence and disjointed implementation of at least
77 sectoral laws of colonial origin.
mandates.11 A recent study also found that lack of
coordinated approach to policymaking as well as
persistent overlaps between various laws governing
wastes creates fragmentation which undermines
effective MSWM in Nairobi and other urban areas.12
The point of departure for this paper is the need to
interrogate deeper the persistence of regulatory
fragmentation in the MSWM and its implication of
integrated and sustainable management of solid waste
in urban areas of Kenya.
The problem of regulatory fragmentation and its
adverse impacts on environmental sustainability is
widely acknowledged.13 Regulatory fragmentation is
said to occur when different segments of regulation
are not encompassed into a broader vision for effective
environmental management,14 such that regulatory
strategies and instruments which address diverse
environmental medium (air, water, and land), are
pursued separately.15 Invariably, this leads to shift
rather than minimisation of pollution across such
environmental media.16 Sectoral coordination is
viewed as an antidote to regulatory fragmentation in
that it uses instruments and mechanisms that induce
voluntary or forced alignment of tasks and efforts of
organisations within public sector, leading to greater
coherence and reducing redundancies.17
In promoting sustainability, sectoral coordination is
viewed as a means of incorporating  environmental
concerns into other policy domains, a term referred to
as environmental integration.18 Environmental
integration can be pursued between levels of
government (vertical environmental integration) and
across the same tier of government (horizontal
environmental integration).19
In 1999, Kenya adopted the Environmental
Management and Coordination Act (EMCA)20 as the
framework law which established the institutional and
legal machinery for management of the environment
and created a basis for coordination of sectoral
environmental laws and initiatives.21 EMCA and its
subsidiary legislation – the Environment Management
and Coordination (Waste Management) Regulations,
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workplaces to ensure proper waste management practices,
making them subject to multiple legal regime and
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27 United Nations, ‘Rio Declaration on the Environment
and Development’ 31 ILM 874 (1992), Principle 4.
28 Ton Buhrs, ‘Challenging Contexts- Addressing Obstacles
to Environmental Integration’ (NZPSA Conference,
Massey University, November- December 2015) <https:/
/www.researchgate.net/publication/298305299>.
200622 currently provide the preeminent legal
framework for MSWM at national level. EMCA created
the National Environment Management Authority
(NEMA) as the primary enforcement agency with the
mandate to coordinate sectoral lead agencies and to
promote integration of environmental considerations
in policymaking and implementation.23 NEMA is also
the primate MSWM regulator at the national level as
well.
The Constitution of Kenya 2010 devolved waste
management functions to counties, thus empowering
new county governments to make laws and policies
on MSWM; something which hitherto was the preserve
of central government.24 This also ushered a new era
of inter-governmental relations, characterised by
constitutional distinctiveness of the two levels of
government within a framework of cooperative
governance. Thus two levels of sectoral coordination
in MSWM now operate concurrently, with both
NEMA and county governments as the central actors
increasing the risk of persistence of fragmentation.
This paper therefore seeks to analyses sectoral
coordination in MWSM and its implication for
achieving horizontal environmental integration, an area
that has hitherto attracted limited academic interest.
The paper contends that even though NEMA and
county governments are invested with significant
authority and power to pursue sectoral coordination
in MSWM, this has not translated into effective
horizontal environmental integration of the sector and
has consequently undermined integrated and
sustainable approaches to addressing the waste
problem in urban areas. Using findings from a survey
study conducted as part of a doctoral research25
targeting firms registered as workplaces26 in the
Nairobi metropolitan area, this paper explores the
reasons why horizontal environmental integration has
yet to be achieved. Intergovernmental coordination
between national and county governments and
therefore vertical environmental integration in MSWM
is a rather broad, nonetheless related, area of inquiry
with intricate co-ordinational issues and arguments
that cannot be tackled adequately in this paper without
distending its scope. Thus, the findings contained in
this paper are limited to intra-governmental co-
ordinational issues at the respective levels of governance
in Kenya
2
CONCEPT OF HORIZONTAL
EENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRATION
AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR
SECTORAL COORDINATION IN
MSWM
The UN Conference on Environment and
Development held in Rio de Janeiro (Rio Conference)
in 1992 adopted the principle of integration that
exhorted states to ensure environmental protection
considerations were integral to the development
process for the realisation of sustainable
development.27 Subsequently, the concept of
environmental integration emerged which entails the
incorporation of environmental considerations into
cognitive systems, policies and institutions with the
aim of resolving and preventing environmental
problems.28 Though empirical link between
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31 ibid 8-12.
32 Rabe and Zimmerman (n 15) 63.
33 Tony Gore, ‘The Role of  Policy Champions and
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Administrative Sciences 308.
34 Jing Ma and Keith W Hipel, ‘Exploring Social Dimensions
of  Municipal Solid Waste Management Around the
Globe- A Systematic Literature Review’ (2016) 56 Waste
Management 3-4.
35 Matthew Watson, Harriet Bulkeley and Ray Hudson,
‘Unpicking Environmental Policy Integration with Tales
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Planning C: Government and Policy 481-498.
36 Part 2 clause 3 of Fourth Schedule to the Constitution
of Kenya (2010).
37 Act No 17 of 2012 (Revised edition 2017) which provides
institutional anchorage for County functions relating to
planning, coordination, decentralisation and service
delivery for MSWM.
38 Cap 242 (2012 edition); this Act empowers the Department
of Public Health (now at the County level) to regulate
waste as nuisance to prevent health problems.
39 Act No 13 of 2019, which repeals Cap 286 (Revised
Edition 2012)- hereinafter referred to as ‘PLPA’; it vests
in Director of Physical Planning and County Director
for Physical Planning at both national and county levels,
regulatory powers in respect to land-use and
development control approvals which are connected
to MSWM.
40 Act No 5 of 2007 (Revised Edition 2012) empowers the
Director of Occupational Safety and Health Act to
enforce waste management requirements in registered
workplaces.
implementation of environmental integration and
improvements of environmental quality is difficult to
demonstrate due to research complexities involved,
intermediate outcomes of improved coordination
among sectoral agencies and policies as well as enhanced
internalisation of environmental costs by key actors
have been observed.29
Horizontal environmental integration (HEI) is a level
of environmental integration which targets sectors and
government actors at a particular level of government.
HEI is also seen as a substantive enterprise, that
involves balancing of economic, social and
environmental interests and policies in order to
minimise trade-offs and maximise on synergies.30
HEI is pursued through the use of strategic
instruments (such as environmental assessments,
sustainable development strategies, green budgeting
& procurement) as well as coordinating structures
(central coordinating agency, inter-ministerial and
multi-sectoral committees).31 With regard to
instruments, new forms of market-based and
voluntary instruments which promote sectoral
coordination are preferred over the command and
control types.32 HEI promotes deliberative approaches
involving a wide range of stakeholders in the
negotiation process which encourages experimentation
around means to resolve normative conflicts in
environmental management.33
MSWM presents an optimal regulatory setting for
analysing HEI and sectoral coordination for various
reasons. First, MSWM embodies environmental,
economic and social dimensions, thus necessitating
an integrated approach to its regulation.34 Secondly,
MSWM is characterised by institutional complexity
since management of wastes typically brings together
different sets of regulators to manage different aspects
of the process.35   For instance, there will be different
regulatory authorities handling waste planning,
approvals, operational management (collection,
treatment & disposal), supervision, and reporting. In
the Kenyan context, the Constitution,36 and County
Government Act37 vests in county governments the
power of control of pollution and other public
nuisances (including those from solid wastes) EMCA
vests regulatory powers in NEMA for licensing of
waste transporters, incinerators and dumpsites. Other
sectoral laws such as the Public Health Act,38 the
Physical and Land Use Planning Act,39 Occupational
Safety and Health Act40 designate important regulatory
functions in respective departments established by
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Bank Group 2018) 89.
44 Constitution of Kenya, Art 42.
45 These duties are listed under Article 69 and extend to
non-state actors as well.
46 Constitution of Kenya 2010, Art 69 (2).
47 Robert Kibugi, ‘Governing Land Use in Kenya: From
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and Policy’ (Doctor of Law Thesis, University of Ottawa,
2011) 89.
48 See Robert Kibugi, ‘Development and Balancing of
Interest in Kenya’ in Michael Faure and Willemien du
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in Africa (Pretoria University Law Press 2011) 171-174.
these laws. Effective sectoral coordination is thus
necessary for realisation of HEI in this sector.
The view of waste as an economic resource with
extractable value has emerged as the dominant
paradigm, overshadowing the hitherto view of waste
as a nuisance to be disposed (waste disposal
paradigm).41 To maximise on waste resource
paradigm, priority in MSWM operations is afforded
to waste re-use, recycling and recovery over disposal in
what is known as the waste hierarchy approach.42  This
approach introduces new players (recycling,
composting and energy actors) in the waste
management sector, which hitherto was dominated
by local authorities and environmental regulators (as
per the waste disposal paradigm) thus creating fresh
imperative for sectoral coordination.
Lastly, both national government and county
governments have a shared role in defining the
regulatory framework for MSWM, with national
legislation outlining the environmental standards rules
for procurement and financing of MSWM operations
while local governments promulgate rules that guide
households and other institutions on proper waste
management and disposal.43 In discharging these
roles, both levels of government will require
cooperation of various sectors at the respective levels
hence underlining the need for sectoral coordination.
3
CURRENT STATUS AND CHALLEN-
GES OF SECTORAL COORDINA-
TION IN MSWM
3.1 Normative Anchorage for
Sectoral Coordination and HEI
Sectoral coordination is anchored in the obligations
arising from the constitutional right to clean and healthy
environment.44 It is a composite and judicially-
enforceable entitlement, which includes a right to have
the environment protected for the benefit of present
and future generations through legislative and other
measures, contemplated in provisions outlining
environmental duties of the State and non-state
actors.45 One such obligation is the duty imposed on
every person to cooperate with State organs and other
persons in protection and conservation of  the
environment to ensure ecologically sustainable
development.46 It has been pointed out that the use
of the term ‘person’ in this context means that the
obligation to cooperate is not limited to natural
persons but also extends to body of persons whether
unincorporated or incorporated, including state
agencies.47 Thus, the obligation to cooperate lays
foundation for cooperative environmental governance,
upon which sectoral coordination is made feasible.48
The EMCA has similar provisions upholding the right
Sectoral Coordination in Kenya’s Municipal Solid Waste Management
62
49 EMCA Cap 387, Sec 3.
50 CoK (2010) Art 10 (2) (e); other principles include public
participation, human rights, transparency, accountability,
good governance, integrity, rule of  law, devolution of
power, inclusiveness, patriotism, national unity, social
justice and equity.
51 In the Center Trust & Others v the AG (2012) eKLR (also
cited as Petition No 243 of 2011), the High Court held
that Article 10 Principles were not simply hortatory in
their effect but that policymakers and legislators were
duty-bound to consider them when discharging their
respective mandates.
52 Abdalla Rhova Hiribae & 3 others v Attorney General & 7
others (2013) eKLR also cited as High Court (Nairobi)
Civil Case No 14 of 2010.
53 See Communication Commission of Kenya & 5 others v Royal
Media Services Ltd & 5 others (2014) eKLR also cited as
Petition No 14, 14A, 14B & 14C of 2014 (Consolidated)
Supreme Court of Kenya, para 366-391; The Supreme
Court of Kenya extensively discussed the substance of
sustainable development as one of the Article 10 values
and its application in managing electromagnetic
spectrum for radio and television broadcast as a natural
resource. The Court held that public participation was
critical for realisation of sustainable development by
safeguarding public institutions from private capture
when making public policy decisions.
54 (2017) eKLR also cited as Petition No 50 of 2012, ELC
(Nakuru).
55 See A Hsu and others, Environmental Performance Index
(Yale University 2016)  <http://epi2016.yale.edu/sites/
default/files/2016EPI_Full_Report_opt.pdf>; the EPI
ranks countries’ performance on high priority
environmental issues related to protection of human
health and ecosystems, using a framework of more than
20 indicators.
to clean and healthy environment and principles of
sustainable development.49
Anchorage for sectoral coordination also stems from
the constitutional enshrinement of sustainable
development as a principle of governance50 and
therefore binding upon the State in development,
implementation and interpretation of legal and policy
frameworks and actions.51 This principle is adjudged
to impose positive obligations on public authorities
to take measures to protect the environment, including
adopting policy and legislative frameworks as well as
coordination mechanisms to ensure sustainable
management of resources.52 Application of the
principle within the context of natural resources
management requires balancing of various interests
(public, private, international) to safeguard the public
interest, in line with the transformative nature of the
Constitution of Kenya.53
There is widespread awareness on the existence of the
right to clean and healthy environment, considering
that a large majority (87 per cent) respondents in survey
agreed that the right was engraved in the Constitution.
There is also near-universal agreement (97 per cent)
among survey respondents that citizens have a legal
right to clean and healthy environment free from solid
wastes. The reported perceptions are indeed consistent
with emerging jurisprudence on this matter as
expressed in the case ACRAG & 3 others v Municipal
Council of Naivasha54  where the Court held that poor
waste management and the attendant risks to human
and environmental health constitute an infringement
of the constitutional right to clean and healthy
environment.
A majority (79 per cent) of respondents also agreed
that both state and non-state actors have a duty to
promote this right. A lower majority (49 per cent and
55 per cent respectively), however, agreed with the
proposition that national and county authorities take
seriously their respective duties to promote the right.
Whereas a majority (60 per cent) are aware of
constitutional enshrinement of sustainable
development, few (30 per cent) agree that the principle
is taken seriously in Kenya. Indeed, Kenya is ranked
123 out of  180 countries surveyed in the 2016 Yale’s
World Environment Performance Index (EPI).55
Thus, the perception that duty bearers are not doing
enough to promote environmental rights and
sustainable development has empirical backing.
Adverse ratings of authorities on promotion of
sustainability and right to clean and healthy
environment may undermine credibility and
consequently the willingness of other stakeholders to
effectively cooperate and engage with them in MSWM
for effective horizontal environmental integration.
Several factors may explain the adverse perceptions on
the actual implementation of right to clean and healthy
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56 Andrew Jordan and Andrea Lenschow, ‘Environmental
Policy Integration: A State of the Art Review’ (2010) 20
Environmental Policy and Governance 150-152.
57 ibid 150.
58 Watson, Bulkeley and Hudson (n 35) 484-5.
59 ibid.
60 Basel Convention on the Control of  Transboundary
Movements of  Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, 22
March 1989, 1673 UNTS 57, Art 4 (2).
61 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants,
Stockholm, 23 May 2001, 2256 UNTS 119, Part V of
Annex C of the Convention on ‘General guidance on
best available techniques and best environmental
practices’.
62 Sustainable Development Goals and Targets, in UN
General Assembly Resolution 70/1, Transforming our
World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,
UN Doc. A/RES/70/1 (2015), Goal 12 on Sustainable
Consumption and Production Patterns and Target 12.5
which that by 2030, states will achieve substantial
reductions of waste generated through prevention,
reduction, recycling and use.
environment and the principle of sustainable
development.
First, constraints in institutional capacity of national
authorities as well as county governments (that are
addressed in the next sections of this article) largely
explain why the environmental right and duty as well
as sustainable development are not effectively
promoted in Kenya.
Secondly, there appears to be waning political will for
promotion of sustainability generally and in waste
management specifically at both national and county
government levels. In the survey, 39 per cent of
respondents agreed with the proposition that the
President is committed to addressing MSWM
challenges, hence pointing to low perceptions on the
existence of political will on this matter. At the County
level, 49 per cent and 16 per cent of respondents felt
that County governors and Members of County
Assembly in the target counties were respectively
committed to addressing problems in the MSWM
sector. In the four target counties, only Nairobi has
enacted a solid waste management law. Thus, the slow
pace of legislative development demonstrates limited
political will towards addressing MSWM issues.
Political will and enabling leadership are key factors for
the promotion of environmental integration.56 Since
environmental integration is anchored in a political
system, political will must be harnessed, organised
and maintained to realise success.57 For instance, it
has been observed that when the UK’s Labour Party
took over power in the 1990s on a broad social reform
platform (which included a progressive green agenda),
it facilitated extensive cross-sectoral coordination
hitherto witnessed under the mantra of ‘joined-up
government’.58
Thirdly, there is limited adoption and support for the
waste hierarchy approach in MSWM normative
framework which is not only critical for realisation of
sustainability, but also imposes imperatives for sectoral
coordination.59 Under the Basel Convention,60
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic
Pollutants61 and UN Sustainable Development
Goals,62 Kenya is under obligation to embrace the
waste hierarchy.
The waste hierarchy approach prioritises recovery of
resource value from wastes over disposal and therefore
to segregation of wastes is considered as the first step
towards facilitating such recovery. There is relatively
high level of awareness on the existence of the legal
duty to segregate wastes at the firm level (81 per cent)
but in contrast relatively lower level of satisfaction with
actual segregation of waste (55 per cent). Thus, high
levels of awareness of this duty does not translate
into commensurate perceptions of compliance hence
plausible gaps in enforcement. The study revealed high
levels of satisfaction by respondents with collection
(83 per cent) and transportation of wastes (71 per
cent), but lower levels were recorded in recycling (28
per cent) and sound management of dumpsites (26
per cent). In addition, only a minority feel that County
governments are doing enough to promote recycling
(14 per cent) and composting (18 per cent).
These perceptions underline the preponderance of the
waste disposal paradigm, in which authorities pay more
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63 The Environmental Management and Coordination
(Waste Management) Regulations, 2006 (EMCA Waste
Regulations of 2006); Regulation 5.
64 Interview with Edwin Murimi, Assistant Director,
Environment Department (Solid Waste Management
Section) Nairobi City County Government (Nairobi, 20
September 2018).
65 Interview with Georgina Wachuka, Policy Officer, Kenya
Manufacturers Association (Nairobi, 21 September 2018);
Ms Wachuka opined that plastic manufacturers were
most affected by the form of ‘double taxation’ because
their manufacturing processes invariable result in defects
which have to be utilised in production of secondary
material.
66 Interview with Agatha Kagia, Coordinator, Runda
Residents Association (Nairobi,26 September2018); Ms
Kagia explained that such prohibitions deny households
the opportunity to produce compost for beautification
of their neighbourhoods.
67 EMCA, Sec 7 & 10; The President appoints the
Chairperson of the Board of NEMA, while the Cabinet
Secretary for Environment appoints the Director-
General and other members. Principal Secretaries for
environment and finance as well as the Attorney General
are ex-offio members.
68 Sec 88, EMCA.
69 Sec 90, EMCA.
70 EMCA Sec 117; inspectors can exercise police powers
of  entry, search, seizure and arrests under warrants;
order closure of deleterious activities; issue notice of
improvement and; conduct prosecutions subject to
directions of Office of Director of Public Prosecutions.
71 EMCA Sec 12.
attention and investment in collection and tipping of
waste in dumpsites, rather than facilitate efficient value
recovery. Dissatisfaction by firms with recycling is also
consistent with the actual low waste recycling rates
prevailing in Nairobi and this perhaps signifies limited
support for the critical recycling and re-use elements
of the waste hierarchy in the target sites. The upshot is
that with an under-developed potential for recycling
and recovery, there is limited impulsion towards
sectoral coordination of economic actors associated
with the waste hierarchy approach to MSWM.
These perceptions and the prevailing reality may be
attributed to the fact that, EMCA and other key laws
on MWSM do not have clear expressions of the
provisions of  the waste hierarchy. The EMCA Waste
Regulations of 2006 requires waste actors to embrace
clean production technology in order to minimise
waste generation.63 The regulation however scarcely
provides for other equally important components of
the waste hierarchy—re-use, recycling and recovery.
Additionally, waste authorities in Nairobi do not have
a structured means/mode/manner of engaging with
waste actors over policy and operational issues. Even
though these actors have organised themselves into a
waste management association, contacts with the
County authorities besides licensing are minimal and
often characterised by incessant litigation.64 Informal
waste actors and pickers who largely prop the recycling
industries of Nairobi are side lined from the policy-
making processes. Moreover, the County authorities
have not put in place necessary incentives for promoting
waste value recovery. Instead, disincentives persist, such
as taxation of waste materials recovered from primary
production processes for re-use in making secondary
materials65 as well as prohibitions in composting
domestic waste at household level.66
3.2 Efficacy of NEMA and
County Governments in Sectoral
Coordination
NEMA is established as a national regulatory agency
under the direct control of the National government,
rather than an independent regulator.67  Regulatory
functions of NEMA in MSWM include issuing licenses
to waste transporters, operators of waste sites and
plants involved in treatment, re-use and recycling.68
EMCA also empowers NEMA to halt waste
management operations by obtaining a court order
against the licensee accused of  breaches.69 To
complement its regulatory authority, NEMA is vested
with broad enforcement powers in appointing
environmental inspectors to monitor compliance with
environmental standards, activities of sector-specific
inspectorates and undertake environmental audits.70
NEMA has general oversight powers over waste
authorities designated as lead agencies, which include
taking over neglected functions and performing them
at the expense of  a particular authority.71
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72 EMCA, Sec 9 (2) (a).
73 ibid Sec 9 (2) (m) & (o).
74 Benson Ochieng, ‘Institutional Arrangements for
Environmental Management in Kenya’ in Okidi and
others (eds), (n 21) 203; Evanson Kamau, ‘Pollution
Control in Developing Countries with a Case Study on
Kenya: A Need for Consistent and Stable Regimes’ (2011)
9 Revista Internacional de Direito e Cidadania 29-42.
75 See Office of Auditor- General, ‘Report of the auditor-
general on the financial statements of national
environment management authority for the year ended
20 June 2016’  <http://oagkenya.go.ke/Audit-
Reports?path=State%20Corporations>.
NEMA is vested with a general duty to coordinate
environmental management activities carried out by
lead agencies and this provides statutory basis for
exercise of sectoral coordination vis-à-vis lead agencies
including waste management authorities.72 In
addition, NEMA is mandated to render technical
support and promoting cooperation among lead
agencies, particular on environmental education, public
awareness and participation.73
There is evidence to suggest that NEMA enjoys near-
universal recognition of its primacy in environmental
protection and promotion of sustainable
development, with 86 per cent of  surveyed firms
agreeing with that proposition. However, NEMA’s
rating on other key regulatory and enforcement
functions appear to decline as evidenced by the survey
results below:
Issue/Proposition  Level of agreement (%) 
NEMA adequately plays its role in environmental protection in 
Kenya 
54 
Under extreme circumstances, NEMA shuts down establishments 
that do not observe sound waste management practices 
54 
NEMA plays a critical role in MSWM in my county  46 
NEMA officers inspect our neighbourhoods to ensure we collect 
and store solid waste in an environmentally-safe manner 
42 
NEMA officers routinely arrest and prosecute those who illegally 
dump or mishandle solid waste in my neighbourhood 
36 
NEMA officers routinely educate residents on how to manage 
waste in an environmentally-safe manner 
36 
Table 1: Assessment of NEMA on MSWM  
 
NEMA’s poor rating from the survey is consistent
with findings from other studies74 that focused on its
actual performance, and several factors may explain the
prevailing state of affairs with implications for sectoral
coordination in MSWM. First, NEMA has in recent
years faced funding constraints which coincided with
the decision by National government to substantially
reduce fees levied for environmental impact assessment
(EIA) licenses. A review of audited financial reports
of NEMA indicates that between the financial years
2014/5 and 2016/7, income derived from EIA licenses
on average constituted 71 per cent of  NEMA’s total
revenue.75 In FY2015/6 NEMA earned
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76 Interview with Maureen Njeri, Head of  Waste Management
Section, NEMA headquarters (Nairobi, 11 August 2018)
and Veronica Maina, Officer –in-Charge, Waste
Management Section, Nairobi County NEMA offices
(Nairobi, 18 September 2018).
77 See Office of Auditor- General (n75).
78 Key informant interview with Maureen Njeri (n76) who
observed that staff took part in several coordination
meetings held to discuss SWM issues in the emerging
extractives sector, funded by the World Bank.
79 EMCA S.2 whch defines lead agencies to include
government ministries empowered by law to control or
management any element of natural resources or
environment.
80 Interview with Dr Ayub Macharia, Director, Ministry of
Environment and Forestry (Nairobi,  29 November2018).
81 EMCA S.10; The Chairperson of the Board is appointed
by the President while other members of the Board
who are not ex-officio (including the Director General)
are appointed by the Cabinet Secretary.
82 (2019) eKLR; also cited as Tribunal Appeal No. NET 196
of 2016.
83 The project proponent, Amy Power Company is partly
owned by Centum Investment Group, a holding
company associated with some powerful business leaders
close to the political establishment. The government
was also heavily vested in the success of this project as
part of  its ambitions to expand power generation capacity.
Ksh524,803,000/= from EIA license fees before
dropping to Ksh269,829,000/= in FY2016/7 after
the fees were drastically reduced, representing a 38 per
cent drop in overall revenue. Thus, funding constraints
mean that NEMA is not able to employ and retain
sufficient staff to discharge their mandates. It was
observed that due to shortfalls in technical staff,
NEMA was unable to participate in most coordination
mechanisms convened to address environmental
challenges at any given time.76
Secondly reduction in revenue base means that NEMA
is not able to adequately discharge its functions unless
with external funding from development partners. A
review of  NEMA’s official audit reports from FY
2013/4 to 2017/8 show that external funding to
NEMA comprises on average 27 per cent of the annual
total grants the agency receives.77  In the various audit
reports, donor funding is captured as development
funding whereas, government grants go to recurrent
expenditure. Thus, NEMA totally depends on donor
funding for its programming. This predisposes
NEMA to capture by foreign donors, further
weakening its independence and therefore regulatory
capacity. Under such circumstances, NEMA staff
invariably participated more in donor-funded
coordination mechanisms on MSWM, than in other
cases where no funding was provided.78
Thirdly, the relationship between NEMA and
ministries of National government as lead agencies is
rather problematic. The Ministry of Environment &
Forestry is designated by law as a lead agency,79  but
also provides policy oversight and support (as part of
its constitutional role) to NEMA, among other
agencies under its ministerial ambit. Within the context
of MSWM, the Ministry recently took over regulatory
functions pertaining to hazardous wastes under the
various international treaties80 and therefore its
activities fall under the coordination ambit of NEMA.
Because NEMA is not an independent regulatory
agency, it plays subordinate role to the Ministry and
lacks muscle to exercise its power over the Ministry as
a lead agency. It is doubtful that NEMA can feasibly
exercise powers over the Ministry of Environment
(or any other ministry for that matter) as a lead agency
with success, unless the definition of the term is
amended to exclude ministries of National
government.
Fifth, the institutional design of NEMA and the
control of the selection and appointment process by
the President and Cabinet Secretary predisposes the
agency to complete control by the National
government.81 This makes NEMA vulnerable to
politicisation and political interference in its decisions,
thus undermining its sectoral coordination role. The
case of Save Lamu & 5 others v National
Environmental Management Authority (NEMA) &
another82 is instructive. This appeal was filed by an
NGO and group of residents of Lamu at the National
Environment Tribunal against the decision by NEMA
to grant Amu Power Company Ltd an EIA license for
establishing a coal-fired power plant, on grounds that,
among others/ inter alia, there was no adequate public
participation. In upholding the appeal, the Tribunal
was critical of  NEMA’s role and conduct in the whole
process of EIA licensing, particularly the manner in
which the Authority disregarded comments from lead
agencies and allowing the project proponent to ‘run
the show,’ as it were.83 Thus, this case illustrates that
84 Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Fourth Schedule, Part 2
Sec 2 (g) & 3 as read with Public Health Act, cap 287.
85 ibid Part 2 Sec 8 as read with Physical and Land Use
Planning Act.
86 ibid Part 2 Secs 1, 4, 5,7 & 8.
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when political pressure is applied on NEMA, the
agency can easily shirk its sectoral coordination
obligations for expediency, by subverting or
disregarding the mandatory consultative approach
required under the EIA process.
At the County level, County governments are
mandated to regulate and deliver services on solid waste
within the context of controlling public nuisances and
promoting public health.84  County governments also
exercise strategic oversight roles on MSWM through
land-use regulation and development control
regulation, which determine the siting of related
facilities and infrastructure.85 County governments
have power to regulate waste generators operating
within their jurisdictions by overseeing agricultural
facilities (e.g. livestock yards & abattoirs), public
amenities, transport facilities, markets and public
housing.86
Issue/proposition  Level of 
agreement (%) 
County Govt considers compliance with waste management regulations of 
my business establishment before issuing us with an annual business/trading 
license 
43 
County Govt ensures timely collection of wastes in my neighbourhood 37 
County Govt in extreme cases shuts down commercial and industrial 
establishments that do not observe sound MSWM practices and relevant law 
33 
County Govt under extreme circumstances issues notice of closure to 
establishments that fail to observe sound waste management practices 
32 
County Govt officers routinely inspect our neighbourhood to ensure 
residents collect and store solid waste in an environmentally- safe manner 
30 
County Govt allows participation of residents/community associations  in 
waste management decision-making  
26 
County Govt officers routinely arrest those who illegally dump wastes in my 
neighbourhood 
24 
County Govt manages public dumpsites in an environmentally-safe manner 17 
County Govt officers educate residents on how to manage waste in an 
environmentally-safe manner 
17 
Table 2: Performance of County governments in MSWM  
 
87 In Machakos, the waste department was domiciled at the
time of the study in the devolution and public services
ministry.
88 Nairobi City County, Nairobi County Integrated Development
Plan 2014 (Nairobi City County, 2014) 174.
89 Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, Economic Survey 2018
(KNBS, 2018) 145.
90 Key informant interview with Edwin Murimi (n 64)
Nairobi City County Government.
91 (2016) eKLR also cited as Petition No 118 of 2016, High
Court at Nairobi (Milimani Law Courts).
92 NEMA (2015) supra pp 48-49; Rather, the Strategy
recommends that NEMA retains policy, supervision,
enforcement and capacity building roles in SWM whereas
County governments take up waste planning, collection,
disposal, awareness creation, enforcement and
promotion of partnerships.
93 Key informant interview with Marcelline Odhiambo,
Public Health Officer, Public Health Department
(Nairobi City County Government, 11 August2018).
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In all the four Counties targeted by this survey,
functional waste departments had been established
under the respective environment ministry except
one.87 In all the target Counties, the respective waste
departments had taken over all aspects of waste
operations except licensing of transporters and
operators, which was still under NEMA. Except
Nairobi, all other three Counties were yet to adopt
solid waste laws and hence were relying on the bylaws
that had been enacted by the defunct local authorities
in the pre-2010 constitutional dispensation. However,
survey respondents rated rather poorly,  the
performance of the County governments in discharge
of key MSWM functions as shown below:
The upshot is that these perceptions point to weak
regulatory and operational capacity of County
governments in discharging their MSWM
responsibilities. With such poor perceptions, Counties
credibility and therefore ability to convene stakeholders
at the county level for coordination on MSWM issues
is effectively undermined. This also undermines
effective consideration of other sectoral perspectives
in regulation of waste activities at the County level.
Several issues explain the prevailing state of affairs,
with implications for sectoral coordination. First,
Counties are not allocating sufficient funds to MSWM
functions. In its integrated development plan for 2014-
2017, Nairobi City County for instance, projected to
spend Ksh5 billion for MSWM services for the
FY2013/4- 2016/7.88 However, during the same
period, the City County spent at total of Ksh2.9
Billion on MSWM services, hence 42 per cent of  the
projected costs were not funded.89  Without adequate
funding, City officials lamented challenges in
procurement of  adequate equipment, servicing of
waste collection contracts and poor management of
dumpsites.90 Given these constraints, it is unlikely
that the County officials will prioritise expenditures
for sectoral coordination functions over service delivery.
Secondly, lack of  clarity in the division of  regulatory
responsibilities between National and county
governments continues to hamper the ability of
County governments to assert their full authority on
MSWM. The bone of contention in this regard is the
power to license key waste actors (transporters, facilities
and traders). In the case Waste and Environment
Management Association of Kenya (WEMAK) v
Nairobi City County & NEMA91 an association of
waste collectors sought the annulment of provisions
of  the Nairobi City County Solid Waste Management
Act, 2015 on various grounds among them that the
impugned Act purported to confer upon the
respondent County government the power to license
waste operators and incinerators, contrary to provisions
of EMCA. The judge declined to suspend the Nairobi
waste law and observed that a cursory reading of  the
Fourth Schedule to CoK 2010 indicates that regulation
of waste management was a devolved function.
Even though the National Solid Waste Management
Strategy (2015) acknowledged the need for
reconceptualisation of the role of the NEMA vis-à-
vis those of County governments in MSWM, it did
not go far enough to resolve the ambiguity.92  Due to
this persistent ambiguity, County officials are unable
to exercise much authority over waste actors licensed
by NEMA, accusing the Agency of not sharing
licensing information with counties to facilitate
effective monitoring and enforcement against these
actors.93 In view of these, the prospects of County
governments convening actors licensed by National
government for sectoral coordination purposes
appears rather unfeasible.
94 Despite NEMA exercising licencing powers over waste
actors, county governments continue issuing business/
trading licences to same actors. The County government
also issues permits for disposing wastes at its official
dumpsites.
95 (2004) ZACT 1 also cited as Case Number 21/IR/Apr02.
96 Key informant interview with John Kanini, Director of
Environment, Kajiado County Government (Kajiado,
09 October 2018).
97  Key informant interview, Nimrod Masaka, Ag. Director,
 Urban Planning Department, Nairobi City County
 Government (Nairobi, 10 September 2018).
98  ibid Sec 61.
99  Key informant interview with Maureen Njeri (n 76) of
NEMA HQ.
100 OSHA Sec 27.
101 Key informant interview, Kenneth Njuguna, Head of
Hygiene Division, Department of Occupational Safety
and Health (DOSH) (Nairobi, 11 August 2018).
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Thirdly, Counties that were targeted by the study had
fused within the respective waste departments, both
regulatory and operational functions.94 This appears
to create a conflict of interest in that the department
may abuse its licensing powers by either excluding
competitors from the private sectors from lucrative
waste management services or permitting non-
compliant County equipment or facilities to operate
in disregard of standard regulatory requirements, hence
undermining the quality of  waste services rendered to
residents. The South African Competition Tribunal
made a similar observation in the case Dumpit Waste
Removal v The City of Johannesburg & Pikitup
Johannesburg Ltd95 and held that where a local (waste)
authority had statutory mandate to license its own
entities to compete with independent companies in
provision of  waste services, this might be viewed as
flouting basic requirements of fairness as provided
for in the Constitution and administrative law.
Therefore, unless the licensing and operational
functions of waste authorities are decoupled, private
sector may find it difficult to effectively engage with
County government on coordination initiatives.
Fourth, corruption and impunity are prevalent in the
target Counties and this undermines the capacity of
waste authorities to discharge their respective mandates
effectively. In Kajiado County, an official cited a case
where a private waste collector colluded with local
officials in re-dumping collected wastes in
neighbourhoods in order to inflate the number of
collection trips hence payments.96 In Nairobi City
County, cartels are deemed to hold a tight stranglehold
on lucrative waste management procurement processes
and in the running of  Nairobi’s only authorised
dumpsite (Dandora).97 Corruption and impunity thus,
fundamentally undermines credibility of County
authorities to effectively coordinate other sectors and
therefore ability to handle trade-offs necessary for
balancing environmental and economic considerations
hence undermining environment integration.
3.3 Effectiveness of Sectoral
Coordination Mechanisms at
National and County Levels
Under EMCA, NEMA is required to establish the
Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) to review EIA
reports and advise the Authority accordingly.98 By
bringing together representatives from different sectors,
TAC represents a sectoral coordination mechanism.
However, funding challenges have impeded the
holding of regular TAC meetings.99
Under the various sectoral laws, NEMA has been
incorporated in decision-making structures of sectoral
agencies and this provides opportunity for promotion
of sectoral coordination. Under OSHA for instance,
NEMA is a member of the National Council for
Occupational Safety and Health (NACOSH), which is
multi-sectoral in its composition and is responsible
for policy formulation and general oversight.100
NEMA representatives regularly attend the meetings
of NACOSH and this places the Authority in a prime
position to influence the work of the Directorate of
Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH) in regards to
occupational hygiene and environmental protection at
the workplace.101
102 ibid Sec 75.
103 EMCA, Sec 9 (2) (a).
104 This was initially provided under EMCA, Act No 8 of
1999 under Part III (now repealed).
105 ibid, Sec 70 -1 (now repealed).
106 Key informant interview, Maureen Njeri, NEMA HQ
(n 76) and Kenneth Njuguna (n 101) DOSH; Both
NEMA and DOSH have in the past established ad hoc
task groups to carryout joint investigations (e.g. on the
suspected case of lead poisoning at an informal
settlement known as Owino Ouru in Mombasa County
in 2014) and both are currently involved in a donor-
funded task group on developing regulatory framework
for occupational safety and health in the extractives
sector.
107 Interview with Koyier Barreh, Planning and EIA Expert
     (Nairobi, 10 September 2019).
108 (2018) eKLR also cited as Petition No 53 of 2012, ELC
      at Nakuru.
109 ibid para 73.
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Under Physical and Land Use Planning Act, NEMA is
also represented in the National Physical Liaison
Committee, which plays policy advisory role as well as
entertaining appeals against decisions made by national
planning authority. This includes environmental
impacts of strategic projects including MSWM
facilities.102 However, this structure is relatively new
and yet to be operationalised.
NEMA is further mandated to coordinate with lead
agencies on environmental protection programmes
including MSWM.103 However, no formal structures
exists to facilitate coordination in a systematic and
structured manner. The 2014 amendments to EMCA
abolished the National Environment Council (NEC)
and the Standards and Enforcement Review
Committee (SERC), which served as key sectoral
coordination structures in the environment sector. The
NEC served as the policymaking and coordination
organ with broad stakeholder representation in which
NEMA served as the secretariat.104  The SERC hitherto
was chaired by the Permanent Secretary in the
environment ministry and comprised of NEMA (as
secretary) and other lead agencies.105 Through the
SERC, NEMA would exercise a mandatory convening
power over lead agencies in relation to standard-setting
and norm development in the environment sector.
Thus currently, NEMA interacts with sectoral agencies
mostly on ad hoc basis, in response to emergent
environmental crises or in donor funded initiatives.106
There is a strong perception among stakeholders that
NEMA is too preoccupied with its enforcement roles
and much less on sectoral coordination.107  The Court
had occasion to scrutinise NEMA’s sectoral
coordination role in MSWM in the case Osano &
another v Municipal Council of Nakuru108  where local
residents had accused NEMA of neglecting its
regulatory duties, precipitating a waste dumpsite crisis
in Nakuru town. NEMA defended itself by
contending that it had taken all steps to address the
waste crisis including prosecuting the offending local
authority.  The Court found NEMA to have neglected
its statutory duties and thus duly noted:
Though NEMA must be commended
for discharging its investigative and
prosecutorial powers in this case, it
needed to do much more pursuant to
its functions under section 9 of
EMCA. It ought to have exercised its
co-ordination, advisory and technical
support functions with a view to
ensuring the citizens’ right to a clean
and healthy environment is
safeguarded. Success of NEMA will
ultimately be seen more in a clean and
healthy environment for Kenyans than
in anything else.109
This holding underlines the need for NEMA to strike
a balance between use of coercive powers to elicit
compliance, with leveraging on its sectoral coordination
role to ensure lead agencies have capacity and inclination
to address waste management issues.
At the County level, sectoral coordination is expected
to take place between and among County departments
vested with operational and regulatory responsibilities
in MSWM and with non-state actors. These
departments include, the Department of environment
110 ibid Sec 29 & 30.
111 According to John Kanini (n 96) of Kajiado County
Government, the selection of members gazetted by
the Governor were found to have violated the law and
hence the Department of Environment has advised
the same be reviewed.
112 Interview with Stephen Kimutu, County Director,
NEMA, Kiambu County  (Kiambu Town, 29
August2018) and Patrick Kimeu, Senior Administrative
Officer, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, Machakos County Government (Machakos
Town, 10 August2018);  the key informant observed
that the respective Governors were not happy with
the initial list of nominees presented to them for
appointment and hence the delays.1
Law, Environment and Development Journal
71
which is responsible for licensing and operational
aspects of MSWM; Department of physical planning
responsible for approving land use (including citing
of waste facilities) and building approvals; Department
of public health which enforces the law on wastes (as
nuisances) and participates in building approvals;
Department of trade/public administration renders
business/trading licenses to business.
In the four target counties, the study established strong
coordination and collaboration between public health
and physical planning departments ostensibly due to
their shared mandate of rendering building approvals.
On the other hand, there is strong collaboration and
coordination between the departments of
environment and trade/public administration. In all
Counties, the departments of health and physical
planning complained of being left-out in key decision-
making processes led by the environment department
e.g. the process of  development of  solid waste
legislations and licensing of operators. Thus, inter-
departmental coordination at the County level is rather
problematic. This is attributed to a persistent culture
of working in silos, which is common in bureaucracies;
limited incentives (under staff performance
management) for inter departmental collaboration and;
budgeting frameworks which underemphasise cross-
department initiatives.
EMCA establishes the Count Environmental
Committee (CEC) responsible for environmental
management and formulation of a county strategic
environmental action plan, to which MSWM matters
are integral.110 The Committee is constituted by the
Governor and chaired by the County Executive
Committee Member (CECM) responsible for
environment. It draws its membership from key
ministries, regional development authorities operating
within the county, NEMA and non-state actors (private
sector, NGOs and farmers/livestock representatives).
The presence of NEMA in the CEC provides a vertical
informational link between county actors and national
institutions. The CEC plays an important sectoral
coordination role and therefore environmental
integration at the county-level, including on MSWM
matters.
In the study counties, Machakos and Kajiado had
established County Environment Committees,
whereas in Nairobi and Kiambu, the respective County
governors were yet to appoint nominees to the
Committees. The Kajiado CEC was appointed in
February 2015 as a pioneer in Kenya. The Kajiado CEC
formulated the inaugural County Environment Action
Plan (CEAP) and took part in the development of
the first generation County Integrated Development
Plan (CIDP). Following the election of a new Governor
in Kajiado in 2017, the CEC was reconstituted
following departure of some key county officials.111
The Machakos CEC was appointed in September 2018
but is yet to formally meet, after the appointment
process was found to have been defective in the same
manner as the Kajiado one. This points to weaknesses
in the appointment process. The reasons for delays in
the appointment of CECs in Kiambu and Nairobi
were attributed to political considerations.112
Consistent with the foregoing, the survey respondents
gave a rather poor assessment of CECs with 28 per
cent aware that the respective County government had
established a CEC and; 26 per cent agreed CECs were
active and visible in the respective counties. The
perceived poor performance of CECs can be attributed
to various factors. First, CECs face budgetary
113 Hens Runhaar and Peter Driessen, ‘Sustainable Urban
Development and the Challenge of Policy Integration:
An Assessment of  Planning Tools for Integrating Spatial
and Environmental Planning in the Netherlands’ (2009)
36 Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design
418.
114 ibid Sec 58.
115 Regulation 18 (f) of the Environmental (Impact
Assessment and Audit) Regulations, 2003.
116 Sec 68 of EMCA; waste management actions are to be
     included in the assessed measures and impacts thereof.
117 Interviews with Ms Kagia of Runda Residents
Association (n 66) and John Mutinda, Chairman
Environment committee of Syokimau Residents
Association (Nairobi, 18 November 2018).
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constraints due to limited financial allocations by
County governments for their operations. Secondly,
there is no clarity regarding the proper institutional
home of the CEC. Because CECs are creatures of
EMCA, County government officials feel that the
committees should be domiciled in and funded by
NEMA. Yet, NEMA argues that CECs are appointed
by respective County governors and comprise largely
county officials and hence should be treated as county
structures. This persistent ambiguity has also
contributed to limited financial allocations to the
functions of CECs.
Fourthly, CECs largely operate at the County
headquarter- level and are yet to be decentralised to the
sub-county level, where implementation of
environmental activities takes place. This diminishes
their outreach and visibility. Lastly, the CECs are
dominated by county officials and therefore may lack
independence in the discharge of their oversight role.
Related to this, County Governors continue to bungle
the appointment process by trying to ensure the CECs
are dominated by their political supporters and this
undermines the legitimacy of these structures.
3.4 Application of Instruments
that Promote Sectoral Coordi-
nation
Environmental impact assessments (EIA) are perhaps
the best known tools for environmental integration.113
Developers of projects specified in EMCA that are
likely to have significant impacts on the environment
are required to undertake prior an environmental
impact assessment (EIA) study and acquire a license
from NEMA.114 Among some of the issues to be
considered in the EIA study include waste generated
by the proposed project.115 Having been issued with
EIA license, the project operator (licensee) is required
to undertake environmental audits (EA) periodically,
and submit to NEMA an audit report on compliance
with approved environment management plan (EMP)
and indicating measures undertaken to mitigate any
unforeseen but undesirable effects.116 NEMA is
required to ensure lead agencies with particular interest
in a proposed project to review the EIA study report
and submit comments, thus facilitating sectoral
coordination in this regard. Mandatory consultations
by NEMA with the public over EIA reports also play
a sectoral coordination role.
The survey respondents’ ratings of  the EIA process
was very positive with 72 per cent of respondents
whose establishments are subject to EIA requirements
reporting that the environmental management plans
developed pursuant to EIA license requirements
adequately prioritise MSWM issues. 80 per cent of the
respondents acknowledged that their establishments
focus on MSWM issues when conducting respective
environmental audits (EA) while 68 per cent felt that
NEMA prioritises MSWM issues in approving EAs
carried out by respective establishments. These
approval ratings for the EIA and EA processes may
be construed as satisfaction with the suitability of EIA
and EA tools in MSWM regulation.
Residents associations were, however, critical of EIA
approvals rendered for projects within the target
Counties. They felt that the NEMA issued EIA licenses
without putting taking into account the views of the
communities, thereby making decisions that imperil
the environment.117 This effectively undermines the
credibility of EIA as a tool for environmental
integration. Inadequate consultation of stakeholders
affected by an EIA decision invariably leads to
unwarranted litigation. This speaks further to the need
118 Runhaar & Driessen (n 113); Hogl & Norbeck (n 18).
119 Sec 37, EMCA.
120 Sec 38 (l), EMCA.
121 Government of Kenya & NEMA, National Environment
Action Plan Framework: 2009-2013 (NEMA, 2009) 11-12.
122 Sec 40, EMCA.
123 Of the 4 CIDPs reviewed, only Kajiado CIDP (2018-
2022) mentioned the formulation of a CEAP as a
priority under implementation of initiatives under
Environment Management Improvement.
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for NEMA to enhance its capacity in facilitation and
promotion of public participation and stakeholder
consultation.
Environmental planning is also another important
tool for horizontal environmental integration.118
NEMA has the mandate to formulate a National
Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) every 6 years for
approval by the Cabinet Secretary.119 The process of
formulation of NEAP involves various stakeholders
including lead agencies and non-state actors at the
national level. Of note, the plan proposes guidelines
for integration of standards of environmental
protection into development planning and is binding
to all persons and public authorities.120
Since 1994 and up to 2013, the Government prepared
and adopted NEAPs on a 6-year basis.  Since the
adoption of the Constitution 2010, however, the
Government has not adopted the NEAP which is
suggestive of  a low prioritisation of  this tool. Notably,
the last NEAP (2009-2013) had a section dedicated to
MSWM and contained such useful interventions as
promotion of cost-effective and appropriate waste
management technologies, research and development
of  recycled products.121 The survey revealed that
NEMA was in the process of developing a new NEAP
and had been involving private sector organisations
and residents associations in the process. NEAP had
incorporated MSWM issues and this could form a
good basis for national solid waste planning. The
extent to which NEAP influences government
budgeting and programming is, however, unclear. The
current Medium-Term Expenditure Framework
(MTEF), which is a strategic budgeting document,
contains no mention of  the NEAP.
EMCA mandates the respective County Environment
Committees (CEC) to develop a county environment
action plan (CEAP) for consideration and adoption
by the respective County Assembly.122 NEMA has a
role in the development of CEAP and is required to
ensure its alignment to the NEAP. Public participation
and institutional consultations are a requirement in
the development of  both NEAP and CEAP. In terms
of  contents, the CEAP borrows largely from NEAP,
only that it lacks a provision binding CEAP vis-à-vis
other persons and public authorities at the county level.
MSWM issues facing a county and actions required to
address the same are part of the CEAP as well.
All the counties targeted by this study had developed
a CEAP during the first tenure of devolved
governments (2013-2017). In the absence of duly
appointed CECs, the CEAP process was largely
undertaken by technocrats in the respective
environment departments of the target Counties.
These plans were never submitted to the respective
County Assemblies for deliberation and adoption and
therefore remain as just policy drafts. The CEAPs are
not referenced in the integrated development plans of
the respective Counties and there is no indication
whatsoever that they inform the budget processes.123
Therefore, there was limited stakeholder engagement
and therefore it is doubtful if the first-generation
CEAPs played a meaningful sectoral coordination role,
which is vital for environmental integration. The
influence of CEAP in the design and implementation
of development projects in the respective counties
therefore remains unclear.
124 Sustainable Waste Management Bill, Sec 4 & 5.
125 Ministry of  Environment and Forestry, National
Sustainable Waste Management Policy: Revised Draft, (Ministry
of  Environment and Forestry, April 2019)  <http://
www.environment.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2019/
04/Revised_National_Waste_Policy_2019.pdf>.
126 On file with the author.
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3.5 Prospects for Improved
Sectoral Coordination
The study has underscored the entrenchment of the
principle of sustainable development and right to clean
and healthy environment in the Constitution as
providing a foundation for implementation of the
concept of environmental integration in MSWM.
However, the legislative framework, particularly the
EMCA framework, do not adequately entrench norms
supportive of  the waste hierarchy and circular economy.
Without imposing clear obligations on waste actors
in relation to waste re-use, recycling and recovery, the
EMCA framework misses an opportunity for
providing a framework for sectoral coordination of
these actors.
The Ministry of Environment in the National
Government is spearheading efforts towards
enactment of a consolidated national law on solid
waste management—the Sustainable Waste
Management Bill of 2019. The draft law has
incorporated environmental protection rights and
obligations as well as waste hierarchy approach in its
framework.124 If enacted, the Bill would contribute
significantly at a normative level to environmental
integration in the sector. The Ministry has also
developed a draft national solid waste management
policy125 which would complement the
implementation of the national solid waste law upon
enactment. At the County level, the Council of
Governors has developed model county solid waste
management law and policy126 as legislative guides to
assist Counties formulate appropriate frameworks
anchored in the waste hierarchy and circular economy
concepts.
There is a need for environmental interest groups to
advocate for the enactment of these laws and policies
at both national and county level. There is also a need
for NEMA and County governments to collaborate
in the development and implementation of
comprehensive waste education programmes, which
will aim to build support for the implementation of
waste hierarchy. An informed citizenry is more likely
to demand for action from political leaders and thus,
promote political will necessary to ensure sectoral
coordination and resolution of MSWM problems.
With EMCA and the subsidiary Waste Regulations
(2006) as the current preeminent MSWM legal
framework, NEMA therefore continues to occupy a
central place in regulation of wastes at both national
and county levels. NEMA’s continuing role as
coordinator of sectoral agencies places the regulator in
a leveraged position to influence effectively
environmental integration in the MSWM. To empower
NEMA to discharge its obligations effectively, there is
need to reconsider the decision on the drastic reduction
of EIA license fees and reverse the same in order to
increase the Authority’s revenue base. Secondly, there
is a need to strengthen the Technical Advisory
Committee for effective sectoral coordination within
the context of  the EIA process. To secure the
independence of NEMA, there is need to
reconceptualise the Authority as a shared institution
between the National and County governments and
ensure both levels of government are represented in
the governance structure of NEMA.
The adoption and operationalisation of devolved
system of governance has had positive impact on
environmental management generally. County
governments are now vested with substantial
environmental management responsibilities and
resources as compared to the defunct local authorities’
predecessors. Despite a clear role in MSWM, county
authorities were rated poorly by respondents in most
aspects of MSWM regulation. There is need for County
governments to consider increasing funding levels for
MSWM activities in a manner which promotes the
waste hierarchy approach for sustainability. There is
also need to ensure clarity between sharing of
regulatory responsibilities in MSWM between National
and County governments, through amendment of
NEMA or an advisory opinion at the Supreme Court.
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Counties should also consider strengthening intra-
county departmental coordination, through improved
funding for these initiatives. The County should also
put in place incentives for promoting inter-
departmental cooperation such as embedding in the
performance management framework, rewards
targeting heads of departments who foster such
collaboration. Accordingly, departmental budgets
should also contain provisions to support inter-
departmental collaborative initiatives. The County
environmental committees (CECs) should be
strengthened through proper financing, streamlining
procedures for appointment of members and further
decentralisation at the sub-county levels.
The study analysed the potential for utilisation of
regulatory tools for promoting sectoral coordination
such as the environmental assessments and planning
processes that have strong linkages with MSWM.
NEMA and environmental interest groups should
promote stakeholder engagement and public
participation in the EIA process to increase its
legitimacy and fulfil its potential for sectoral
coordination. The National government should
strengthen the NEAP process by enhancing stakeholder
engagement and regular publication of the plan. At
the County level, Governors should ensure adoption
of CEAPs and support the subsequent
implementation processes.
4
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has reviewed the framework for sectoral
coordination and horizontal environmental
integration in Kenya’s MSWM sector. Key gaps in the
normative framework, capacity of NEMA and County
governments as well as shortcomings in sectoral
coordination instruments undermine the potential for
sectoral coordination at both levels of government.
This in turn weakens effective operationalisation of
horizontal integration in MSWM, thus diminishing
the realisation of integrated and sustainable MSWM
system. However, there is opportunity for addressing
the gaps within ongoing environmental sector reforms.
More research is required to assess the prospects of
enhancing sectoral coordination through such tools and
processes as strategic environmental assessments,
regulatory impact assessments, green budgeting and
procurement at both county and national levels.
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